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Section 14141 of the Violent Crime Act of 1994 fundamentally 
restructures the regulation of police behavior in the United States.  Since 
the law’s passage, dozens of police departments have undergone lengthy 
and complex reforms designed to eliminate a pattern or practice of 
misconduct.  Despite the program’s wide application, neither scholars 
nor practitioners know much about the efficacy or sustainability of these 
reforms.  This paper draws on longitudinal data across several outcome 
metrics, including citizen complaints, use of force incidence, and civil 
litigation, and a series of interviews with key stakeholders to examine 
pattern or practice initiatives in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Washington, 
D.C., Cincinnati, Ohio, Prince George’s County, Maryland, and Los 
Angeles, California.  Findings suggest that the reform process has the 
ability to minimize unwanted police misconduct and generate desirable 
policy outcomes, particularly during the period of Department of Justice 
(DOJ) oversight.  Sustaining these reforms after the settlement 
agreement is dissolved, however, has proved a challenge.  
 
“We don’t tend to evaluate . . . after we have left.” - Vanita Gupta1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
On May 26, 2015, Vanita Gupta, Head of the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
Special Litigation Section (SPL), announced an agreement between the DOJ and 
the City of Cleveland, Ohio.  Seven months earlier, Tamir Rice, an unarmed 
twelve-year-old Black boy was shot and killed by the Cleveland Division of Police 
(CDP) in an incident that quickly came to symbolize the tension between the CDP 
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and its community.2  The settlement was not designed to address the actions taken 
by officers involved in the Rice killing, but to address the wider problem of 
excessive force within the CDP.3  Gupta assured the people of Cleveland that the 
agreement would “transform this police agency into a model of community-
oriented policing that will make both police officers and the people they serve 
safer.”4  
The investigation of the CDP occurred pursuant to § 14141 of the Violent 
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which vests the DOJ with 
authority to initiate legal action against law enforcement agencies found in 
systematic violation of constitutional or statutory law.5  
This provision has been instrumental in identifying unlawful behavior in 
many of the country’s most prominent police departments, and has generated 
settlement agreements that articulate deep reforms to the offending department’s 
organizational model and accountability systems.  The initiative continues to serve 
as the primary means of addressing systemic police misconduct in the United 
States.  In fact, in the last eighteen months, the DOJ has used its pattern or practice 
authority to investigate allegations of systemic misconduct in several cities 
experiencing recent police-involved violence, including Ferguson, Missouri, 6 
Baltimore, Maryland,7 and Chicago, Illinois,8 among others. 
Though perhaps this recent wave of litigation is unprecedented in its speed 
and aggression, the use of federal power to address police misconduct is nothing 
new.  Since 1994, the DOJ has investigated allegations in some sixty-eight 
jurisdictions, taking formal legal action against thirty-eight departments found to 
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have engaged in a pattern or practice of misconduct.9  Rather than litigate these 
claims, most jurisdictions opt for settlement.10  The resultant agreements, which 
are enforceable in federal court, typically require the affected department to update 
relevant policy, revamp training requirements, and develop an infrastructure 
designed to promote internal and external officer accountability.11  
In many cases, including those reviewed here, an independent monitor is hired 
to oversee implementation and establish the terms of compliance.  These 
agreements remain in place until the police are determined to have been in 
“substantial compliance” with the terms of the agreement—typically defined as 95 
percent compliant—for at least two full years.12   The emerging department is 
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five percent.”  PUB. MGMT. RES., AUDITOR’S NINETEENTH QUARTERLY REPORT 53 (2002), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-PA-0003-0020.pdf.  Similarly, “MPD’s 
demonstration of a sustained UFIR completion rate between 86% and 91% . . . [was] quite high, even 
if below the 95% threshold.”  MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, OFFICE OF THE INDEP. MONITOR, FINAL REPORT 
OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR FOR THE METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (2008), 
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stamped with the imprimatur of lawfulness and designated as a model for other 
departments in terms of lawfulness, accountability, and transparency.13  
The pattern or practice initiative, as it has become known, has been a useful 
tool for police chiefs and elected officials seeking change,14 as well as reform 
minded community members.15  Anecdotal evidence suggests that many affected 
department leaders have found the process worthwhile as well.16  The response has 
not all been positive, however.  Some have claimed that the DOJ’s enforcement of 
§ 14141 is overly political,17 with decisions on which jurisdictions to investigate 
made for partisan rather than policy reasons.18  Others have argued that the process 
is anti-democratic and unnecessarily exclusive of perspectives brought to bear by 
citizen groups and labor organizations.19  Some have also questioned whether this 
process, which often lasts for several years and costs cities tens of millions of 
dollars,20 is capable of producing meaningful, durable organizational change.21  
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The record of police department efforts to achieve and sustain organizational 
reform is at best mixed. 22   Many of policing’s most promising innovations, 
including high-profile efforts like community policing and problem-oriented 
policing, have not lived up to their initial promise.23  Despite this pattern, those 
who study the police have largely overlooked the issue.  In general, scholars know 
relatively little about the bureaucratic response to reform and thus remain 
somewhat ignorant about how and why innovations in policing continue to erode.24  
This is not entirely surprising given the complexity of the issue.  
Comprehensive reform efforts resist the kinds of clear, simple terms that facilitate 
ex post evaluation.  The process is defined by multiple goals, varying perspectives, 
and competing political, administrative, and legal motivations, all conspiring to 
form “a confusing and contradictory picture of change.”25  The complexity of the 
process is only magnified by the intensity of the current political and social context 
and the contentiousness with which police officers confront changes to the 
organizational status quo.26  
Opposition among front line officers to pattern or practice reform is one of 
several reasons to study the process.  The significance of the initiative, the issue 
that precipitates it, and the vehemence of arguments on both sides is belied by how 
little we actually know about the effectiveness and sustainability of these reforms.  
Despite its relevance to legal, administrative, and policy scholarship, to date there 
has been relatively little social science research on the reform process, with a 
particularly glaring lack of empirical analysis.  
This paper is a step toward filling in this gap.  Part II reviews the existing 
research that addresses efforts to institutionalize changes to organizational 
structures, policies, and procedures in other contexts.  Part III explains the 
selection of departments for case studies, the available data, and the data’s 
limitations.  Part IV draws on longitudinal data across several metrics, including 
violent and property crime, citizen complaints, use of force incidence, and civil 
litigation to examine the sustainability of reform in various jurisdictions, including 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Washington, D.C.; Prince George’s County, Maryland; 
Cincinnati, Ohio; and Los Angeles, California.  Part V assesses what we can learn 
about the sustainability of reform from these examples.  
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23  Samuel E. Walker, Institutionalizing Police Accountability Reforms: The Problem of 
Making Police Reforms Endure, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 57 (2012). 
24   Id. at 60.  
25  CANADIAN CTR. FOR MGMT. DEV., TAKING STOCK: ASSESSING PUBLIC SECTOR REFORMS 6 
(Guy Peters & Donald J. Savoie eds., 1998).  
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II. EXISTING LITERATURE ON INSTITUTIONAL REFORM LITIGATION 
 
A. The Sustainability of Court-Mandated Organizational Change 
 
The need for closer attention to this issue is highlighted by the impermanent 
nature of reforms brought about in other policy contexts through similar means.  
Much like pattern or practice settlements, judicially enforced remedial orders 
attempt to structure detailed reform of public bureaucracies found in systematic 
violation of the law.27  This process has been used to facilitate the desegregation of 
school districts,28 remedy unconstitutionally abusive prison systems,29 and assert 
the rights of patients held unlawfully by state-run mental hospitals,30 among others.  
Again, as with pattern or practice reform, formal oversight is terminated upon 
a determination (typically made by the presiding judge) that the underlying 
constitutional violation has been redressed.  As a result, many see the process as 
inherently fragile.  At the heart of these arguments is the contention that the 
sustainability of reform is undermined by the use of a transitory policy solution—
external oversight—to remedy what in many cases is a chronic organizational 
problem.31  In the absence of persistent external oversight and accountability, the 
argument goes, the affected bureaucracy can, and perhaps must, revert to ex ante 
operating procedures. 
Two examples illustrate the point.  Despite the significant gains made 
following the Brown decision,32 over the last twenty years or so, scholars have 
documented the increased segregation of primary and secondary school children 
along racial, economic, and linguistic lines.33  Some contend that resegregation has 
occurred as a direct result of limitations placed on the ability of federal district 
                                                                                                                            
 
27  PHILLIP J. COOPER, HARD JUDICIAL CHOICES: FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT JUDGES AND STATE 
AND LOCAL OFFICIALS (1988). 
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AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). 
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Conditions?  What Have We Accomplished to Date?, 24  PACE L. REV. 419 (2004). 
30  Jonathan Brant, Pennhurst, Romeo, and Rogers: The Burger Court and Mental Health Law 
Reform Litigation, 4 J. LEGAL MED. 323 (1983). 
31  Michele Deitch, The Need for Independent Prison Oversight in a Post-PLRA World, 24 
FED. SENT’G REP. 236 (2012). 
32  CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, AFTER BROWN: THE RISE AND RETREAT OF SCHOOL 
DESEGREGATION 48 (2004). 
33  See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Segregation and Resegregation of American Public 
Education: The Court’s Role, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2003); Sean F. Reardon et al., Brown Fades: 
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31 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 876 (2012). 
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court judges to continue to manage local school districts.34  Rights-based reforms 
achieved through litigation against state prison systems have eroded under similar 
circumstances.  A recent examination of the Arizona Department of Juvenile 
Corrections, which operated under federal control between 2004 and 2007, 
documented post-termination slippage in two areas critical to the initial reform 
effort: suicide prevention and inmate education.35  In each case, the absence of 
external pressure to adhere to new operational protocols corresponded with a 
reversion to pre-intervention practices.  
 
B. Evaluating Organizational Reform 
 
The term institutionalization is used to define the process of converting a 
reform effort into an established part of the organization’s normal functioning36 
and “a way of regularly conducting . . . business.”37  According to Oliver,38 once 
organizational activities are institutionalized, they are assumed to become 
relatively stable, enduring, reproducible, and sustainable over long periods of time 
without continuing justification.  In this sense, “institutionalized” reforms are 
synonymous with “sustainable,” “enduring,” and “lasting” changes.39  
Identifying the point in time when a reform implementation effort ends and 
institutionalization begins is a complex task.  This determination is particularly 
difficult in part as a result of the fact that the complex and perpetual nature of 
many implementation efforts makes a fixed end point difficult to identify.  It is 
similarly difficult to identify the point at which assessment of a program’s 
sustainability should begin.  Here too the nature of the analysis resists a definitive, 
dichotomous answer, and what little research does exist provides conflicting 
                                                                                                                            
 
34  GARY ORFIELD, SCHOOLS MORE SEPARATE: CONSEQUENCES OF A DECADE OF 
RESEGREGATION 2 (2001), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-education/integration-and-
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separate-2011.pdf; Chemerinsky, supra note 33. 
35  Melanie Ann Taylor, A Case Study of the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act: 
Reforming the Arizona Department of Juvenile Corrections (May 2013) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Arizona State University), 
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36  THOMAS G. CUMMINGS & CHRISTOPHER G. WORLEY, ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT AND 
CHANGE 189 (8th ed. 2005). 
37  TRENT IKERD & SAMUEL WALKER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MAKING POLICE REFORMS 
ENDURE: THE KEYS FOR SUCCESS 5 (2010), http://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p176-pub.pdf. 
38   Christine Oliver, The Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization, 13 ORG. STUD. 563 (1992). 
39  Id. at 581. 
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guidance.  Some scholars believe that analysis should begin after one year;40 others 
say institutionalization takes somewhere between five and ten years to manifest.41 
Previous scholarship has employed various approaches to examine the 
institutionalization of organizational reform, beginning with an assessment of staff 
response.  This can be accomplished by measuring both the extent to which 
organizational actors are aware of and understand changes to policy and agency 
priorities brought on by the reform,42 as well as “the degree to which intervention 
behaviors are actually performed.”43  
Staff willingness to adopt new operational protocols is often couched in terms 
of organizational culture.  Policing scholars have consistently found cultural 
change—measured in terms of individual officer preferences, norms, and values—
predictive of institutionalized reform.44  The sustainability of pattern or practice 
reform is at least in part likely to be a function of the degree to which street and 
mid-level officers, as well as department leadership, have come to view both the 
letter and the spirit of the settlement as central to the department’s mission and 
reflective of the department’s broader approach to policing.  
Yet organizational reform is rarely pursued for these ends.  Cultural and/or 
behavioral change is typically instrumental, sought as a means to improving certain 
measurable outcomes.45  Since the early 1990s, public management scholars have 
advocated the use of outcomes to measure the performance of public agencies and 
individual bureaucrats, rather than intangibles like attitudes or culture. 46   The 
notion of “measuring what matters” is a strong current in policing research as 
well.47  Police practitioners are also heavily dependent on these data—arrest rates, 
use of force statistics, demographic and geographic data, etc.—to drive officer 
behavior and evaluate policy change.  The Compstat movement is one such 
example; predictive policing and crime mapping are others.  
Part of the challenge in evaluating the durability of organizational reform is 
identifying performance measures that accurately identify sustainable change.  
                                                                                                                            
 
40  NHS MODERNISATION AGENCY, IMPROVEMENT LEADER’S GUIDE TO SUSTAINABILITY AND 
SPREAD (2002). 
41   John P. Kotter, Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail, 73 HARV. BUS. REV., 
Mar.-Apr. 1995.  
42   Trent E. Ikerd, Beyond “Flavor of the Month”: Institutionalizing Problem-Oriented 
Policing (POP) in the CMPD, 33 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 179 (2010). 
43  CUMMINGS & WORLEY, supra note 36, at 196. 
44  See, e.g., WESLEY G. SKOGAN & SUSAN M. HARTNETT, COMMUNITY POLICING: CHICAGO 
STYLE (1997); IKERD & WALKER, supra note 37. 
45  Kathryn E. Newcomer, Using Performance Measurement to Improve Public and Nonprofit 
Programs, 75 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EVALUATION 5 (1997). 
46  Robert D. Behn, Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different 
Measures, 63 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 586 (2003). 
47  NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, MEASURING WHAT MATTERS: PROCEEDINGS FROM THE POLICING 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE MEETINGS 151 (Robert H. Langworthy ed., 1999). 
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Two types of outcome measures are relevant, beginning with systematic metrics 
that establish broad, agency-wide performance.  First, in terms of pattern or 
practice reform, several such indicators are relevant, including frequency of officer 
use of force incidents, citizen complaints, and civil suits filed against the 
department.  In fact, nearly every key stakeholder interviewed as a part of this 
research stated that trend data is the most useful way to gauge the effectiveness of 
a reform effort and a department’s progress toward institutionalization. 
Second, an organization’s ability to sustain change can also be evaluated in 
terms of its ability to avoid large-scale “performance crises.”  These events can 
take the form of isolated, high profile incidents, like a police shooting or a 
particularly vicious use of force caught on tape.  Think Rodney King.  Even one 
such episode can shake the public’s confidence in the agency, negatively affect 
employee morale, and weaken organizational support for departmental leadership.  
To illustrate the magnitude of such a crisis, Oliver argues that the Space Shuttle 
Challenger disaster undercut the agency’s reputation and “provoked serious doubts 
within the organization about a range of long-standing practices and procedures.”48  
Along the same lines, Cincinnati City Manager Milt Dohoney acknowledged,  
 
[T]he only thing that could undo the good that’s been done is for [the 
Cincinnati Police Department] to have a number of questionable 
situations at the street level where a citizen gets either seriously injured 
or is the recipient of a use of deadly force . . . . [T]hat can bring all of 
that past baggage back up.  You can have one incident that really gets the 
community on edge.49  
 
The perception of systematic and protracted corruption—LAPD’s Rampart 
scandal, for instance—would no doubt have a similar destabilizing effect in a post-
reform jurisdiction.  
To summarize, scholars have examined the sustainability of organizational 
reform using four interrelated metrics: (1) staff knowledge of and compliance with 
new protocols; (2) the extent to which staff culture reflects reform values; (3) 
trend-based outcome data; and (4) the presence or absence of performance crises.  
This research will track pattern or practice institutionalization by examining 
metrics 3 and 4.  What follows is a discussion of the data and method used.  
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III. CASE SELECTION, DATA, AND METHOD 
 
Thirteen of the twenty-four jurisdictions facing federal oversight between 
1994 and 2010 reached substantial compliance with the terms of their settlement 
agreement.  Of those, only Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C., Cincinnati, Prince 
George’s County, and Los Angeles were willing (or able) to share relevant 
outcome data. 50   These data, including use of force incidence, citizen-based 
allegations of misconduct, officer disciplinary decisions, and civil litigation related 
to police misconduct, were drawn from agency annual reports, independent 
monitor reports, and the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report database.  Where data was 
not available publicly, Freedom of Information Act requests were filed with 
affected police departments and other relevant city agencies.  
 
Table 1. Sources of Data and Years of Availability 
 
  Pittsburgh 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Prince George’s 
County Los Angeles Cincinnati 
Use of force PBP  
(2004–2014) 
MPD  
(2001–2015) 
NA LAPD 
(2001–2015) 
CPD  
(1995–2012) 
Civil 
litigation 
NA City of DC  
(2000–2010) 
NA City of LA  
(2000–2010) 
NA 
Citizen 
complaints 
CPRB  
(1998–2014) 
OPC  
(2001–2015) 
CCOP 
(2006–2014) 
NA CCA  
(2005–2012) 
Crime UCR  
(1985–2012) 
UCR  
(1985–2012) 
UCR  
(1985–2012) 
UCR  
(1985–2012) 
UCR  
(1985–2012) 
Note: PBP = Pittsburgh Bureau of Police; MPD = Metropolitan Police Department; CPD = Cincinnati Police 
Department; CPRB = Citizen Police Review Board; OPC = Office of Police Complaints; CCA = Citizen 
Complaint Authority; CCOP = Citizen Complain Oversight Panel; UCR = Uniform Crime Report. 
 
As is clear from Table 1, both the sources and availability of these data vary 
greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  In many cases, data were simply not 
available for the pre-reform period.  Thus, establishing performance level 
benchmarks was all but impossible.  In Cincinnati, the Citizen Complaint 
Authority, which was created as a result of the reform effort, began collecting data 
in 2005, some three years after the initiation of federal reform.  In other instances, 
the analysis was complicated by changes in the way agencies captured and 
presented relevant information.  For example, between 1998 and 2005, 
Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) shifted how they 
                                                                                                                            
 
50  The remaining eight jurisdictions include: the State of New Jersey; Steubenville, OH; 
Montgomery County, MD; Highland Park, IL; Buffalo, NY; Mount Prospect, IL; Villa Rica, GA; and 
Cleveland, OH. 
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defined and categorized officer use of force incidents, rendering a consistent pre-
post analysis all but impossible.  
As a result of these deficiencies, the analysis presented falls short of a formal 
program evaluation and as such no causal conclusions are offered.  There are, 
however, sufficient data to analyze the bureaucratic response to external reform 
mandates.  Changes observed across each metric over time are evaluated as 
separate, but interrelated, markers of the effects of reform and the sustainability of 
such changes.  Insights from several stakeholders, including independent monitors, 
police department leadership, and relevant political and community leaders were 
gathered from several in-depth interviews and are used to supplement the 
quantitative analysis. 51   Newspaper reports and other secondary sources were 
helpful in establishing context and tracking the incidence of performance crises.  
 
IV. FINDINGS 
 
Before presenting the results of this analysis, it should be noted that in most 
cases, neither the effects of reform nor institutionalization should be measured 
dichotomously.52  Organizational change is something that proceeds incrementally 
and thus is most effectively measured in degrees.  With that in mind, the analysis 
proceeds chronologically, beginning with Pittsburgh. 
 
A. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 
 
In April, 1997 the city of Pittsburgh agreed to settle DOJ claims that the 
Bureau of Police (PBP) had engaged in a pattern or practice of unlawful activity, 
including the use of excessive force and a failure to discipline officers 
adequately.53  The consent decree was in place until September 2002.54 
Shortly after the decree was lifted, the Vera Institute of Justice attempted to 
gauge the degree to which “local officials can maintain [consent decree] reforms 
                                                                                                                            
 
51  The research that preceded this paper received Institutional Review Board approval.  All 
but one interviewee agreed to speak on the record.  A subject list and interview transcripts are on file 
with the author. 
52  It is worth noting that not all reform efforts proceed incrementally, and some fail to take 
hold at all.  See Samuel Walker, Does Anyone Remember Team Policing? Lessons of the Team 
Policing Experience for Community Policing, 12 AM. J. POLICE 33, 34–35 (1993) (describing the 
failure of the team policing reform effort); see also LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN, SCANDAL AND REFORM: 
CONTROLLING POLICE CORRUPTION (1978) (describing the failure of the effort to require officers to 
obtain a college degree). 
53  Consent Decree, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, 2:97-cv-00354-RJC (W.D. Pa. Feb. 
26, 1997), https://www.justice.gov/crt/united-states-district-court-western-district-pennsylvania-
united-states-america-plaintiff-v-0. 
54  Stipulated Order, United States v. City of Pittsburgh, No. 97-0354 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 
2002), https://www.justice.gov/crt/united-states-district-court-western-district-pennsylvania. 
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after the federal government and its monitor withdraw.”55  Drawing on survey data 
and interviews with PBP officers and leaders from key civil society groups 
gathered between March, 2003 and March, 2004, Vera evaluated the sustainability 
of changes to police behavior, officer morale, and public opinion brought on by 
federal oversight.56 
Three themes emerge from this research.  First, PBP officers seemed to 
understand and respect the goals of the reform, but were strongly resentful of the 
process.57  In fact, only a tiny percentage of those surveyed felt the reforms had 
improved performance or produced more professional encounters with citizens.58  
Second, despite this opposition, the first year or so after federal oversight was 
lifted, PBP maintained operation of various reform initiatives, including their early 
intervention system, new officer training protocols, and regular oversight 
inspections.59  Third, a majority of community leaders and members of the public 
saw the PBP as effective in stopping crime, helping victims of crime, and working 
together with city residents to solve local problems.60  Based on these findings, the 
authors conclude that “the implementation of the consent decree requirements in 
Pittsburgh dramatically changed the culture of the Bureau of Police” and that key 
departmental changes “survive[d] the life of the decree intact.”61   
Much has happened in Pittsburgh since the study was published, including 
three mayoral transitions, the installation of four new police chiefs, and a 
protracted budget crisis. Recent data suggest that advances in officer accountability 
and community trust have eroded considerably over the last several years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
55  ROBERT DAVIS, NICOLE HENDERSON & CHRISTOPHER ORTIZ, CAN FEDERAL INTERVENTION 
BRING LASTING IMPROVEMENT IN LOCAL POLICING?: THE PITTSBURGH CONSENT DECREE 2 (2005), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/277_530.pdf.  Because the Office of 
Municipal Investigations (OMI) remained under the consent decree during the period when Vera 
examined the sustainability of reform at PBP, their 2005 report does not address efforts to 
institutionalize changes at OMI. 
56   Id.  
57  Id. at 21. 
58   Id. at 19–20. 
59   Id. at 7–14. 
60   Id. at 39. 
61   Id. at 40–41. 
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Figure 1. Citizen Complaints of Police Misconduct in Pittsburgh (1998–2014) 
 
 
              Source: Pittsburgh Citizen Police Review Board 
 
Figure 1 charts the citizen-based complaints filed against Pittsburgh Bureau of 
Police officers between 1998 and 2014.  The figure shows a steady increase in total 
allegations until 2008, with a significant uptick occurring following consent decree 
(CD) termination.  On average, there were 556 allegations made annually against 
PBP officers during the implementation period.  In the six years immediately 
following termination, the mean annual total jumped to 822, an increase of 48 
percent.  Complaints have fallen precipitously in recent years, with the 499 
recorded in 2014, the second lowest annual total since the CPRB came into 
existence.  The percentage of complaints alleging unlawful use of force has also 
dropped fairly steadily since the DOJ terminated their oversight.  That this 
occurred, even as annual complaint totals spiked, should be seen as circumstantial 
evidence of PBP’s success in mitigating such incidents. 
Citizen allegations of misconduct are important ways of assessing PBP 
officers’ use of discretionary authority, their willingness to comply with law and 
Bureau policy, as well as their general attitudes toward city residents62—the very 
behavior targeted by the consent decree, either directly or indirectly.  
                                                                                                                            
 
62   Kim M. Lersch, Police Misconduct and Malpractice: A Critical Analysis of Citizens’ 
Complaints, 21 POLICING: AN INT’L J. POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 80 (1998); Jeff Rojek & Scott H. 
Decker, Examining Racial Disparity in the Police Discipline Process, 12 POLICE Q. 388 (2009); 
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These data also provide a window into the operation of management and 
accountability systems created as a product of the reform effort.63  Officer training, 
accountability infrastructure, and chain-of-command oversight all exist to either 
prevent or mitigate the kind of behavior that generates citizen complaints.  What is 
more, citizen complaints help to define the Bureau’s culture.64  A culture that 
values the rule of law, citizen rights, and accountability would surely have 
relatively fewer such complaints than a department that either overlooked or 
treated with impunity violations along the lines of the categories measured below.  
According to former Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) 
chief Charles Ramsey,65 citizen complaints are an important metric for tracking 
officer behavior and the sustainability of those systems, cultural norms, and values 
developed during the CD process: “Citizen complaints . . . [must be] review[ed] 
very carefully . . . to make sure that not just with use of force in terms of physical 
force, but even verbal abuse and complaints, things of that nature. . . . [A]ll those 
things . . . we want to monitor.” 
 
Figure 2. PBP Officer Use of Force, Disciplinary Actions (2004–2014) 
 
 
                  Sources: Pittsburgh Citizen Police Review Board; Pittsburgh Bureau of Police 
 
                                                                                                                            
SAMUEL E. WALKER & CAROL A. ARCHBOLD, THE NEW WORLD OF POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY (2d ed. 
2013).  
63   CARL B. KLOCKARS ET AL., ENHANCING POLICE INTEGRITY (2006).  
64   John D. McCluskey & William Terrill, Departmental and Citizen Complaints as Predictors 
of Police Coercion, 28 POLICING: AN INT’L J. OF POLICE STRATEGIES & MGMT. 513 (2005). 
65   Interview with Charles Ramsey, former Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Dep’t Police Chief 
(May 20, 2010). 
2016] EVALUATING SECTION 14141  
 
 
81 
Given the several factors that may influence citizen complaint data, including 
the ease of filing complaints and trust in the complaint investigation process, and 
the ambiguous relationship between complaints and police behavior,66 it is helpful 
to view these kinds of data together with other indicators of officer performance.  
Figure 2 tracks both use of force reports filed by PBP officers and the disciplinary 
actions taken by PBP leadership.  Though the relationship between the two 
variables is unknown, that use of force has increased since 2004 just as disciplinary 
actions have declined suggests a curious and potentially troubling finding.   
There are several possible explanations.  The rise in use of force incidence 
could be a reflection of a department-wide emphasis on more accurate reporting, 
with officers mandated to document all use of force regardless of its nature or 
perceived insignificance.  The decline in use of force-related citizen complaints is 
in line with the idea that documentation, not actual use of force, has increased.  It 
is possible too that the reduction in disciplinary actions is consistent with this 
narrative.  It is also quite possible that the combination of these trends is evidence 
of a department whose officers have become more violent and less accountable.  
Though certainly not definitive, the broader context, including a recent history 
of political and departmental corruption and several high-profile incidents of police 
use of force, lends some credibility to the latter interpretation.  
Robert McNeilly was hired in April 1996 and served as Chief in Pittsburgh 
until January 2006.  McNeilly remains an outspoken proponent of DOJ-led reform 
and believes that the consent decree process helped to transform the PBP. 67  
Despite his reputation as a “micromanager” and a “disciplinarian,” many believe 
the PBP was more accountable, more lawful, and more community-friendly during 
McNeilly’s tenure than it was before his hiring.68 
The same is not said of the PBP today,69 and a concerted effort to move away 
from McNeilly’s leadership may be partly to blame.  According to McNeilly, his 
longtime political battles with Mayor-elect Bob O’Connor precluded a cooperative 
transition.  “I knew (O’Connor) wouldn’t keep me on for good, but I offered to 
stay there until [new chief] Costa settled in . . . to smooth the transition,” McNeilly 
                                                                                                                            
 
66   Compare Kim M. Lersch & Tom Mieczkowski, Who are the Problem-Prone Officers? An 
Analysis of Citizen Complaints, 15 AM. J. POLICE 3, 23–24 (1996), with McCluskey & Terrill, supra 
note 64. 
67   Interview with Robert McNeilly, Police Chief, Elizabeth Twp. Police, in Pittsburgh, Pa. 
(Mar. 1, 2010).  
68   Michael A. Fuoco, Police Chief McNeilly’s Tenure Saw Wrenching Changes, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (Jan. 9, 2006), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/police-
chief-mcneillys-tenure-saw-wrenching-changes-416443/. 
69   Paula R. Ward, Justice Dept.’s Decision in Jordan Miles Case Increases Distrust, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 8, 2011), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-
city/justice-depts-decision-in-jordan-miles-case-increases-distrust-296751/. 
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said. 70   O’Connor never responded to McNeilly’s request to have a “frank 
discussion” about the consent decree, and through his spokesperson issued an icy 
dismissal: “[McNeilly] offered to share what he’d done to comply with the consent 
decree, but it’s a matter of public record what was done, and Chief Costa is more 
than qualified to continue those programs.”71  
Luke Ravenstahl took over as acting mayor in September 2006.  Nathan 
Harper, a career PBP officer and Ravenstahl nominee, took control of the 
department shortly thereafter.  Harper, like McNeilly before him, was seen as an 
extension of the mayor’s office and the city’s Director of Public Safety.  In 
McNeilly’s day, however, as the consent decree was being developed and 
implemented, the city’s executive branch largely supported reform, whereas today 
there appears to be other priorities driving city administration.72  Whether or not 
changes in PBP’s leadership can be causally connected to recent backsliding, it is 
hard to ignore the fact that many of PBP’s biggest problems have occurred since 
McNeilly’s firing. 
To wit, between 2003 and 2005, PBP officers averaged 1,033 use of force 
incidents per year.  Between 2006 and 2012, that number jumped to 1,427, an 
increase of 38 percent.  Similarly, the average number of assaults committed 
against PBP officers in the years after McNeilly was fired was 408, some 49 
percent higher than the average committed during McNeilly’s tenure.  This 
occurred as both property and violent crime trended down. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
70  Jill King Greenwood, Ex-Police Chief Says Mayor Snubbed Him, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-
REVIEW (Mar. 6, 2006), http://triblive.com/x/archive/1416632-74/archive-story. 
71  Id. 
72  Joe Smydo, Mayor Moves to Replace Some Members of Police Review Board, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (June 19, 2010), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-
city/mayor-moves-to-replace-some-members-of-police-review-board-251953/. 
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Figure 3. Crime in Pittsburgh (1985–2012) 
 
 
          Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report 
 
Several recent high-profile incidents contribute to the notion that changes 
made pursuant to the consent decree may have begun to erode with the 
replacement of Robert McNeilly.  In September 2009, Pittsburgh hosted the G-20 
summit.  A cause célèbre for anti-globalization and anti-corporate activists, 
significant protests tend to accompany the annual G-20 meetings.  2009 was no 
exception.  Several hundred protesters were arrested as the city sustained an 
estimated $50,000 in property damage.73  
A September 2010 suit filed by the ACLU on behalf of a class of protesters 
claims the PBP surrounded them, “refused to allow them to leave, ordered them to 
lie on the ground and placed them in handcuffs” in violation of their First 
Amendment right to assembly.  The protesters also allege that the police “falsely 
charged them with failure to disperse and disorderly conduct.”74  
The aftermath of the G-20 protests exacerbated an already contentious 
relationship between Pittsburgh’s independent Citizen Police Review Board 
                                                                                                                            
 
73   Associated Press, 83 Arrested at G-20 in Pittsburg, $50,000 in Damage, PENNLIVE (Sept. 25, 
2009), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2009/09/83_arrested_at_g-20_in_pittsbu.html. 
74  Interview with Robert McNeilly, Police Chief, Elizabeth Twp. Police, in Pittsburg, Pa. 
(Mar. 1, 2010).  In fairness to the police, crowd control and protest management were not specific 
areas of focus under the pattern or practice reform initiative.  The police contend that their behavior 
in response to the G-20 protests was entirely lawful and well-within department protocol.  Alexandra 
Frean & David Byers, Police Embroiled in Violent Battles with G20 Protesters, TIMES (Sept. 24, 
2009), http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/world/americas/article2001320.ece. 
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(CPRB) and the city’s executive branch.75  After receiving scores of G-20-related 
complaints, the CPRB moved to open a general investigation of PBP’s actions 
during the protest.  The mayor’s office successfully litigated to prevent the CPRB 
from accessing G-20 documents.76  After losing an initial round in the legal fight, 
Mayor Luke Ravenstahl replaced five of the Board’s seven members, a move one 
city councilmember believes was an attempt to “circumvent” or “destroy” the 
CPRB.77  Beyond its reflection of alleged police abuse, the city’s response to the 
G-20 investigations suggests a political class, led by the Mayor, which is 
reflexively defensive of the police and the politically powerful officer union, and 
skeptical of transparency and accountability. 
Less than five months out from the G-20 meetings and just over seven years 
after the consent decree was lifted, the Pittsburgh Bureau of Police suffered a 
second major performance crisis.  Three undercover Pittsburgh Bureau of Police 
officers attempted to stop Jordan Miles, a classical musician and a high school 
honor student, near his residence in Homewood, a largely African-American 
neighborhood on Pittsburgh’s east side.78   Miles believed he was about to be 
robbed and attempted to flee the scene.79  After he fell, the officers allegedly 
delivered several blows to Miles’s head and back, ultimately sending him to the 
hospital.  Miles was arrested for aggravated assault and resisting arrest, though the 
charges were later dismissed.80  On March 31, 2014, after several years in court, a 
jury found in Miles’ favor on his claim of false arrest, but denied the excessive 
force charge; he was awarded $119,000 in damages.81 
In March 2013, former PBP chief Nathan Harper was indicted on federal 
corruption and tax evasion charges stemming from an alleged scheme to divert city 
                                                                                                                            
 
75   Sadie Gurman, Chief Ordered to Give Police Review Board G-20 Reports, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2010/03/19/Chief-ordered-
to-give-police-review-board-G-20-reports/stories/201003190154. 
76   Court Rules for Pittsburgh on G20 Arrests, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Dec. 29, 2011), 
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2011/12/29/Court-rules-for-Pittsburgh-on-G20-arrests/UPI-
57881325188557/. 
77   Joe Smydo & Moriah Balingit, Controversy Addressed Over Police Review Board Changes in City, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (June 23, 2010), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2010/06/23/Controversy-
addressed-over-police-review-board-changes-in-city/stories/201006230185. 
78   Between 93 and 95 percent, according to the 2010 U.S. Census.  UNIV. CTR. FOR SOCIAL & 
URBAN RESEARCH, UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH, CITY OF PITTSBURGH NEIGHBORHOOD PROFILES, CENSUS 
2010 SUMMARY FILE 1 (SF1) DATA 47–49 (2011), http://ucsur.pitt.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/UCSUR_SF1_NeighborhoodProfiles_July2011.pdf. 
79  Paula R. Ward, Judge Dismisses Charges against CAPA Student, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/local/neighborhoods-city/judge-
dismisses-charges-against-capa-student-236378/. 
80  Id. 
81  Rich Lord & Liz Navratil, Jordan Miles Jury Reaches Split Verdict, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Mar. 31, 2014), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2014/03/31/Jury-reaches-verdict-
in-Jordan-Miles-civil-trial/stories/201403310142. 
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funds for personal use.82  Harper was sentenced in February 2014 to an eighteen-
month prison sentence;83 he was released from federal custody in May 2015.84  
Of course, these events do not alone signal PBP’s failure to sustain pattern or 
practice reforms.  Longstanding and unaddressed tension between the police and 
minorities, as well as shifts in economic and other social conditions, may help 
explain incidents like the G-20 protest and the alleged beating of Jordan Miles.  
Taken together, the incidents do seem to suggest an erosion of the accountability 
infrastructure developed during the reform period.  Regardless of their cause, such 
incidents have had a dramatic effect on police-community relations in the city and 
continue to negatively affect public perceptions of the Bureau.  
With all of that said, the current state of police-community relations in 
Pittsburgh may be as strong as it has been since 2002, when the consent decree was 
dissolved.  Former Madison, Wisconsin captain Cameron McLay was hired in 
September 2014 and immediately set about attempting to reform a department he 
saw as lacking accountability and community trust.85   Citizens Police Review 
Board Executive Director Beth Pittenger, who has a long history of tension with 
PBP leadership, 86  has seen enough to call McLay’s first year on the job 
“extraordinary.”87  Pittenger went on: “In terms of reorganization, creating a new 
identity in the public perspective and keeping everyone safe, cops as well as the 
                                                                                                                            
 
82  Jonathan D. Silver et al., Attorney: Ex-Pittsburgh Police Chief Nate Harper to Plead 
Guilty, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 22, 2013), http://www.post-
gazette.com/stories/local/region/federal-grand-jury-meeting-suspended-police-finance-manager-on-
hand-680415/. 
83  Rich Lord, Former Pittsburgh Chief Harper Gets 18-Month Prison Sentence, PITTSBURGH 
POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2014/02/25/Former-
Pittsburgh-police-chief-Nathan-Harper-sentenced/stories/201402250123. 
84  Luke Nozicka, Former Pittsburgh Police Chief Nate Harper Released from Prison, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 30, 2015), http://www.post-
gazette.com/local/city/2015/05/30/Former-Pittsburgh-police-chief-Nate-Harper-released-from-
prison/stories/201505300157. 
85  Dale Shoemaker, Chief on Duty: Pittsburgh Police Chief Cameron McLay Wants to 
Change His Force, and He Knows Just How He’s Going To Do It, THE PITT NEWS (Sept. 18, 2015), 
http://pittnews.com/article/63046/news/chief-on-duty-pittsburgh-police-chief-cameron-mclay-wants-
to-change-his-force-and-he-knows-just-how-hes-going-to-do-it. 
86  Jonathan D. Silver, City’s Citizen Police Review Board Still a Subject for Debate, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 3, 2005), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2005/05/03/City-
s-Citizen-Police-Review-Board-still-a-subject-for-debate/stories/200505030245; Christian Morrow, 
Citizen’s Police Review Board: Fire Pittsburgh Cop for Teacher Arrest, PITTSBURGH COURIER (Mar. 
26, 2014), http://newpittsburghcourieronline.com/2014/03/26/citizen-police-review-board-fire-
pittsburgh-cop-for-teacher-arrest/. 
87  Rebecca Nuttall, Cameron McLay Getting High Marks after First Year as Pittsburgh 
Police Chief, PITTSBURGH CITY PAPER (Sept. 23, 2015), 
http://www.pghcitypaper.com/pittsburgh/cameron-mclay-getting-high-marks-after-first-year-as-
pittsburgh-police-chief/Content?oid=1855889. 
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community, all of these things in the short time of a year are truly remarkable.”88  
While it is still in its early days, at least some of McLay’s rhetoric on 
accountability and transparency are supported by evidence.  According to a recent 
analysis of 350 police websites, PBP was the second-most transparent department 
among those sampled.89 
 
B. Washington, D.C. 
 
In June 2001, the District of Columbia and the Washington, D.C. 
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) entered into a Memorandum of 
Agreement (MOA) designed eliminate a pattern or practice of excessive force.90  
The Department reached substantial compliance in June 2008, an occasion for 
former monitor Michael Bromwich to laud the Department and the process:  
 
MPD has become a much more sophisticated police agency. . . . We 
believe that the City’s and MPD’s success in implementing the MOA’s 
reforms, which are now embedded in the Department’s internal policies 
and practices, stands as a model for municipalities and police 
departments across the country.91  
 
MPD Chief Cathy Lanier paints a similar picture.  Not only does she credit 
the MOA with significant improvements to the Department’s accountability 
infrastructure, but with catalyzing a shift in MPD’s officer culture.  Changes made 
under the MOA are “the status quo now.  It’s part of our daily operations.  It’s 
what we do.”92  Despite their remarks, the evidence suggests a more complex 
picture of the institutionalization process. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
88  Id. 
89   On file with author. 
90  Memorandum of Agreement Between the United States Department of Justice and the 
District of Columbia and the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE (June 13, 2001), https://www.justice.gov/crt/memorandum-agreement-united-states-
department-justice-and-district-columbia-and-dc-metropolitan. 
91  BROMWICH, supra note 12, at 3–4. 
92   Chanin, supra note 49, at 257.  
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Figure 4. Citizen Complaints Filed against MPD Officers (2001–2015) 
 
 
       Source: Washington D.C. Office of Police Complaints 
 
The total number of misconduct complaints levied against MPD officers 
increased steadily as the MPD implemented the terms of MOA.  From 2001 
through 2007, annual totals hovered around a mean of 347 complaints, reaching a 
high of 440 in 2007, 42 percent higher than the 310 filed in 2001.  In 2008 (the 
MOA terminated in June of that year), however, total allegations increased to 600, 
an additional 27 percent jump.  Between 2009 and 2012, residents filed an average 
of 566 complaints against MPD officers, well above the volume seen during 
implementation.  As is clear in Figure 4, as complaint totals have been somewhat 
volatile since 2005, the rate of dismissal has been relatively stable over that period, 
with investigators determining that well over half of complaints filed were without 
merit.  
Interpreting these results is tricky, particularly in the absence of a larger 
sample of data.  The upward trend may simply indicate a steady increase in 
unlawful police activity.  It may also signal that reform-based changes, including 
those designed to make the process of filing a complaint easier, were having the 
desired effect.  But even if a simplified complaint process can account for the 
upward trend while the new policies were being implemented, it is unlikely that the 
effect of such changes would stretch beyond the first four or five years of reform.  
In other words, these policy changes do not seem to explain the observed post-
reform spike.  Six years’ worth of data is not nearly enough to justify the 
conclusion that reform gains in D.C. have eroded. 
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Figure 5. MPD Officer Use of Deadly Force, by Incident Type (2001–2015) 
 
 
       Sources: Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police Department 
 
Figure 5 documents MPD use of deadly force between 2001 and 2015 broken 
down by incident type.  Between 2001 and 2008, when the CD was terminated, 
MPD officers averaged 23.4 deadly force incidents per year, 44 percent higher than 
the 13.1 they have averaged since.  Given the small sample and the lack of pre-
MOA data from which to base comparisons, it is difficult to draw anything other 
than superficial conclusions.  The absence of an immediate post-MOA spike is 
worth noting, particularly in light of the dramatic reporting by the Washington Post 
on MPD use of deadly force,93 which is widely believed to have set in motion the 
DOJ pattern or practice investigation.94  It is also worth noting that neither the 
MOA nor its dissolution appears to have affected the decades-long decline in the 
District’s rate of violent or property crime, as is shown in Figure 6. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
93   See, e.g., Jeff Leen et al., District Police Lead Nation in Shootings: Lack of Training, 
Supervision Implicated as Key Factors, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1998, at A1. 
94   See BROMWICH, supra note 12, at app. D. 
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Figure 6. Crime in Washington, D.C. (1985–2012) 
 
 
     Sources: FBI Uniform Crime Report 
 
 
Figure 7. Civil Litigation Alleging Police Misconduct in Washington D.C. 
(1999–2010) 
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Figure 7 charts the total number of civil suits resulting in either a settlement 
or judgment in favor of plaintiffs filing use of force-related claims against the 
MPD.  The significant spike that occurred between 2001 and 2004 is the result of 
litigation stemming from police action taken during the 2000 inauguration of 
George W. Bush 95  and the mass arrest in Pershing Park during a 2002 anti-
globalization protest.96  Combined, Washington, D.C. faced at least fifty-seven 
different suits and paid out a total $34,420,295 in damages as a result of these 
events.97  Non-protest litigation trended downward throughout the reform and has 
remained steady since the MOA was dissolved in 2008.  
 
Figure 8. Pro-Plaintiff Awards in Litigation Alleging Police Misconduct  
in Washington D.C. (1999–2010) 
 
 
 
Figure 8 tracks the total dollar amounts paid out by the District as a result of 
force-related settlement/disposition awards for suits filed during that same period 
of time.  The data show that non-protest payouts were flat during the 
                                                                                                                            
 
95   Associated Press, Protesters Scuffle with Police along Inaugural Route, USA TODAY (Jan. 
20, 2001), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/politics/inaug/2001-01-20-approtests.htm. 
96   Julie Zauzmer, Arrested Protesters Ask for Sanctions on District Officials, WASH. POST 
(July 3, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-03/local/40349777_1_plaintiffs-court-
filing-attorney-general. 
97   These data are of limited value as a part of a broad review of MPD’s efforts to sustain 
reform-related changes, as the settlement agreement did not address in any capacity policy related to 
mass protest.  What is more, the incident occurred less than a year in to the implementation process. 
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implementation period and have continued to decline in the post-reform years.98  
On balance, both the rate and cost of litigation stemming from force-related 
misconduct was fairly stable during the implementation period and has continued 
to trend downward in the years following MOA termination.  
Finally, while MPD has not faced the kind of major event or scandal that has 
plagued Pittsburgh in recent years, over ninety MPD officers were arrested 
between 2009, the first full year after the MOA was terminated, and 2012.99  Police 
accountability expert Sam Walker argues that, in light of the fact that MPD’s early 
intervention system is designed to identify and correct such problematic behavior, 
this pattern “raises very serious questions about whether the accountability 
procedures instituted by the MOA are functioning at all.”100  
 
C. Cincinnati, Ohio 
 
In April 2001, a white Cincinnati police officer shot and killed Timothy 
Thomas, an unarmed black teenager, setting off riots throughout the city.101  In 
response to a pattern of excessive force, the Department of Justice oversaw police 
reform in Cincinnati from April 2002 through April 2007.  During this five-year 
period, in addition to the reforms required by the MOA, the Cincinnati Police 
Department (CPD) also implemented the terms of a privately negotiated settlement 
with several community groups and the local chapter of the Fraternal Order of 
Police.  As a result of this unique arrangement, the CPD was not only required to 
reform its approach to police use of force and officer accountability, but also to 
develop and implement new crime control, order maintenance, and community 
relations strategies.  The changes required of Cincinnati were broader and deeper 
than in any of the several other jurisdictions affected by the DOJ’s pattern or 
practice initiative.  
Six years removed from DOJ and monitor oversight, the CPB has experienced 
little or no discernable backsliding, a finding supported by consistent reductions in 
undesirable outcomes, including use of force incidence and allegations of abusive 
or unlawful behavior.  In short, the reform effort in Cincinnati appears to have 
transformed the CPD. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
98  A total of 68 force-related suits filed between 2003 and 2010 remain unresolved and have 
the potential to increase Washington, D.C.’s total annual payouts.  Yet, even if one projects plaintiffs 
to win every outstanding case and receive the average non-protest payout awarded between 2000 and 
2010 ($57,096), the effect on annual totals would be marginal.  
99  Aubrey Whelan, 90-Plus Arrests of D.C. Cops in Under 4 Years, WASH. EXAMINER (Sept. 9, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/90-plus-arrests-of-d.c.-cops-in-under-4  years/article/2507386. 
100 Walker, supra note 23, at 64.   
101 Francis X. Clines, Appeals for Peace in Ohio After Two Days of Protests, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 
11, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/04/12/us/appeals-for-peace-in-ohio-after-two-days-of-protests.html. 
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Figure 9. Police Use of Force in Cincinnati (1995–2012) 
 
 
              Source: Cincinnati Police Department 
 
 
Figure 10. Crime in Cincinnati (1985–2012) 
 
 
          Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report.  Note: data from 1997 and 1998 are missing. 
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Longitudinal data show significant and lasting change within the CPD.  As 
documented in Figure 9, police use of force in Cincinnati was fairly volatile during 
the MOA implementation period but has dropped by an average of 11 percent per 
year since 2005.  In fact, between 2002 and 2014, as crime rates have remained 
relatively stable, use of force has declined by 46 percent. 
 
Figure 11. Citizen Complaints of Misconduct against CPD Officers (2005–2014) 
 
 
    Source: Cincinnati Citizen Complaint Authority 
 
Data from Cincinnati’s Citizen Complaint Authority (CCA) shows a similar 
downward trend.  According to annual reports filed by the CCA between 2005 and 
2014, complaints against CPD officers continued to decline even after the 
department was released from formal oversight.  As is documented in Figure 11, 
the sixty-five allegations of excessive force investigated by the CCA in 2012 
represent a 26 percent drop in the number of similar allegations made in 2006, the 
last full year that CPD was under federal control.  Further, the percentage of 
complaints against CPD officers found by the CCA to have some merit (i.e., 
sustained) continued to fall in the years following MOA termination.  
The data are more impressive in light of the changes made to the complaint 
process as a result of the MOA.  Prior to the reform, complainants had to appear at 
CPD stations in person.  Today, one can file a complaint by phone or by email, 
directly to CPD or CCA, and may even do so anonymously.  In short, the MOA 
made it easier for people to complain, and far fewer people have.  According to 
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ACLU attorney Scott Greenwood, “overall satisfaction is better.  People—the 
community—trusts the integrity of the review process now.”102  
CCA Director Kenneth Glenn has sensed a change not just in the data, but in 
how complainants view the CPD.  Anecdotally, even though complainants are 
upset about the incident, they are attempting to address, their overall attitude and 
orientation towards the police is more positive.  To Glenn, trust in the CPD has 
continued to grow as a result of the MOA: “[A]s we go out into the community 
and talk with young people in the community . . . the tone is a lot better than it was 
in 2002.”103  That the CPD has been able to avoid a destabilizing, high-profile 
performance failure in recent years contributes to the growth of the Department’s 
legitimacy in the eyes of the community.  
Cincinnati’s City Manager Milt Dohoney’s view of the Department does well 
to summarize CPD’s progress since 2002:  
 
The changes that were made have resulted in . . . a significant drop-off in 
the number of instances where citizens are injured as they’re being taken 
into custody.  There’s a lot fewer injuries to police officers as they’re 
trying to make an arrest.  The allegations of excessive force have 
plummeted.  The incidents where the use of deadly force is even an issue 
has plummeted. . . . [The DOJ] agreement helped make all that happen.104   
 
Cincinnati residents, like those in every other major metropolitan area in the 
country, have experienced their share of violent encounters with the police.  In 
June 2014, CPD officers shot and killed Donyale Rowe following a routine traffic 
stop.105  Police Chief Jeffrey Blackwell immediately released recorded footage of 
the incident and was credited with helping to avoid the kind of wider conflict that 
followed the death of Timothy Thomas.106  Mike Bricker, policy director at the 
ACLU of Ohio, credited the reform effort with this progress: “Even where there is 
a strong intervention and things have changed significantly, I think it’s unrealistic 
to say that there is never going to be another police problem or another issue that 
                                                                                                                            
 
102 Chanin, supra note 49, at 272–73.  
103 Id. at 273. 
104 Id. at 273–74. 
105 Jennifer E. Baker, Chief: Police-Involved Shooting ‘a Fight for Survival,’ CINCINNATI.COM 
(Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.cincinnati.com/story/news/2014/08/05/cincinnati-police-officer-shoots-
man-killed-traffic-stop/13611479. 
106 Susan Vela, Officer Shoots, Kills Suspect, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (Apr. 8, 2001), 
http://enquirer.com/editions/2001/04/08/loc_officer_shoots_kills.html; Marc Fisher, Cincinnati Still 
Healing from its Riots, and Has Lessons to Share with Ferguson, WASH. POST (Sept. 5, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/cincinnati-still-healing-from-its-riots-and-has-lessons-to-
share-with-ferguson/2014/09/05/2ff8b944-34a1-11e4-9e92-0899b306bbea_story.html. 
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crops up . . . . But I think what has changed is that there are much fewer of 
them.”107  And when such incidents do occur, Bricker believes CPD officers “have 
the tools and the training and the mutual understanding of how to talk about these 
issues” to reduce the likelihood of wider unrest.108  
 
D. Prince George’s County, Maryland 
 
On January 22, 2004, Prince George’s County, the Prince George’s County 
Police Department (PGPD), and the U.S. Justice Department signed a 
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) designed to remedy a pattern or practice of 
excessive force.109  
The PGPD MOA adopts a structure and content very similar to those 
settlement agreements established in Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C., and Cincinnati.  
The terms of the MOA require changes to PGPD use of force policy and reporting 
protocols,110 “evaluation, documentation, and review of uses of force,”111 officer 
training,112 “receipt, investigation, and review of misconduct allegations,”113 and 
the development of further officer accountability systems, including an improved 
“early identification” system and a protocol for conducting internal “integrity 
audits” of the department.114  
On January 15, 2009, some five years after the MOA was instituted, the 
independent monitor team filed its final report, documenting PGPD’s substantial 
compliance with all but one of the sixty-nine substantive provisions of the 
agreement.115  
In announcing the MOA’s formal termination, two years after the scheduled 
three-year deadline, County Executive Jack B. Johnson claimed victory: “We have 
rebuilt a police department that was once and now is considered a model for law 
                                                                                                                            
 
107 Nicole Flatow, What Has Changed About Police Brutality in America, from Rodney King 
to Michael Brown, THINKPROGRESS (Sept. 11, 2014), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2014/09/11/3477520/whats-changed-and-what-hasnt-in-policing-the-police/. 
108 Id. 
109 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND PRINCE GEORGE’S COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT 1 (2004), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/pg_memo_agree.pdf.   
110 Id. at 6–8. 
111 Id. at 8–11. 
112 Id. at 11–14. 
113 Id. at 14–18.  
114 Id. at 18–24. 
115 At the end of the five-year implementation process, PGPD was still unable to meet the 90-
day requirement for completing misconduct investigations.  ALEXANDRIA GROUP OF MPRI, REPORT 
OF THE INDEPENDENT MONITOR EIGHTEENTH QUARTERLY REPORT 47–48 (2009), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20110419215549/http://www.princegeorgescountymd.gov/Government/P
ublicSafety/Police/pdfs/Final%20Eighteenth%20Quarterly%20Report%2001-15-09.pdf. 
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enforcement. . . . I want everyone to know that our commitment to improvement 
that we have made while under DOJ oversight will not wane simply because the 
department is no longer watching.”116 
Relative to the other three jurisdictions under review, little is known about 
PGPD’s experience since termination.  There have been no independent reports 
published, and requests to speak with PGPD leadership, County administrative, 
and political officials, as well as members of local civil rights organizations, have 
been denied.  Further, requests for data on police use of force and civil litigation 
outcomes were either denied or fulfilled with unusable data. 
 
Figure 12. Crime in Prince George’s County (1985–2012) 
 
 
        Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report 
 
Like much of the rest of the county, crime in Prince George’s County is down 
precipitously.  On February 4, 2009, shortly after the MOA was terminated, the 
Washington Post published an editorial lauding what it calls a “remarkable 
turnaround,” and attributing some of this success to enhanced PGPD officer 
training requirements and other MOA-driven reforms. 117   These trends have 
continued since termination and add further support to the notion that pattern or 
                                                                                                                            
 
116 Aaron C. Davis, Justice Closes Pr. George’s Police Review, WASH. POST (Feb. 11, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/10/AR2009021002067.html?tid=a_inl. 
117 Opinion, Crime Drops in Prince George’s County, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2009), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/03/AR2009020302969.html. 
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practice intervention does not correlate with increased incidence of either violent 
or property crime.  
A review of what few outcome-based data points that do exist leaves the 
impression that the pattern or practice reform process has not had the same kinds 
of effects in Prince George’s County as it has in other jurisdictions.  
 
Figure 13. Citizen Complaints of Misconduct against PGPD Officers (2001–2014) 
 
 
        Source: Prince George’s County, Maryland Citizen Complaint Oversight Panel 
 
Data from Prince George’s County’s Citizen Complaint Oversight Panel 
(CCOP) indicate that allegations of PGPD officer misconduct increased steadily 
over the lifetime of the five-year agreement.  Figure 13 shows an average annual 
increase of sixty-nine allegations per year between 2004 and 2008.  Total 
allegations of misconduct rose from 472 in 2004 to 650 in 2008, the last full year 
of the implementation process, an increase of 33 percent.  On average, Prince 
George’s County residents filed 641 allegations per year during the MOA 
implementation, some 12 percent less than the yearly average during the 2009 to 
2014 post-implementation period.  
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Figure 14. Citizen Complaints against PGPD Officers, by Type (2006–2014) 
 
 
        Source: Prince George’s County, Maryland Citizen Complaint Oversight Panel 
 
Interestingly, CCOP data shows that between 2006 and 2014, nearly 25 
percent of all allegations made against PGPD officers involved the use of 
excessive force, second most common behind the catchall category, “Conduct.”  
As Figure 14 documents, the rate of excessive force complaints has steadily 
declined since 2008, when some 30.6% involved allegations of excessive force.  
Without a closer examination of the department’s accountability systems, its 
officer culture, or the context offered by a broader set of systematic trend 
indicators, it is difficult to extract much meaning from these data.  Perhaps it is 
enough to say that neither the reform process nor the termination of DOJ oversight 
has had a significant effect on the volume or nature of complaints submitted to the 
CCOP.  
According to a recent story in the Washington Post, PGPD reported 303 use-
of-force incidents in 2010, the first full year after the DOJ terminated oversight.118  
In 2014, the Department logged 555 such incidents, an 83 percent increase.  PGPD 
Chief Mark Magaw denied that this trend was at all worrisome, instead pointing to 
the county’s increased population size and a newly expanded definition of use of 
                                                                                                                            
 
118  Kimbriell Kelly et al., Forced Reforms, Mixed Results, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2015/11/13/forced-reforms-mixed-results/. 
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force: “The way I read these numbers is we’re doing a better job, we’re holding 
our officers more accountable and we’re being more transparent.”119 
Magaw’s sentiment is belied by several media reports of excessive force and 
corruption involving PGPG officers.  In March 2010, several Prince George’s 
County police officers were videotaped beating a University of Maryland student 
during a wild celebration of a victory by the school’s basketball team.  According 
to the Washington Post, PGPD officers falsely accused the victims of aggressive 
behavior in an attempt to justify the use of force: “Police charging documents 
initially alleged that [two students] jointly assaulted police officers and their 
horses.  The video contradicted that, and the charges against the students were 
dropped.”120  The incident, which cost county taxpayers a total of $3.6 million in 
legal fees,121 led the Washington Post editorial board to conclude that if no video 
had surfaced of Mr. McKenna’s beating, that too would have been swept under the 
rug of police impunity and official indifference.  This cannot be allowed to stand.  
It sends a terrible message to the Prince George’s police, who now know that 
consequences for their misconduct, if any, will be slight.122  
The post-MOA list of other incidents involving excessive force is long.  In 
October 2010, five PGPD officers moonlighting as security guards were involved 
in the alleged beating of a student attending a local fraternity party.  Allegations of 
lying and cover-up were attached to this incident as well.123  In September 2012, 
Stephen Merritt, a 23-year veteran of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department, filed civil charges against the county, claiming he was unnecessarily 
beaten by PGPD officers outside a nightclub.124  The criminal charges filed against 
Merritt in connection with the incident were subsequently dropped.125  In October 
2014, two PGPD officers were indicted on charges stemming from separate 
                                                                                                                            
 
119 Id. 
120  Matt Zapotosky & Ruben Castaneda, Feds Now Lead Probe of Police Beating, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/03/AR2010120306980.html. 
121  Officer Receives Suspended Sentence in UMD Beating Case, NBC 4 WASH. (Dec. 14, 2012), 
http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Officer-Sentenced-UMD-Beating-James-Harrison-James-
McKenna.html. 
122  Opinion, A Judge Wrongly Throws Out an Officer’s Assault Verdict in Prince George’s 
County, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2014, at A22. 
123  Ruben Castaneda & Matt Zapotosky, Four More Prince George’s Officers Suspended in 
Alleged Moonlighting Misconduct, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/11/08/AR2010110805432.html. 
124  Matt Zapotosky, D.C. Police Officer Sues Two Prince George’s Officers, Saying He Was 
Beaten, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/dc-police-officer-
sues-two-pr-georges-officers-claiming-he-was-beaten/2012/10/03/66c249b0-0d73-11e2-a310-
2363842b7057_story.html. 
125  Matt Zapotosky, Charges Dropped Against D.C. Police Officer, WASH. POST (Feb. 28, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/crime-scene/post/charges-dropped-against-dc-police-
officer/2013/02/28/8dec0f7c-81e4-11e2-8074-b26a871b165a_blog.html. 
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incidents, “one involving a school resource officer at Suitland High School 
charged with assaulting a student, the other involving the reported assault of a 
handcuffed suspect in a jail cell.”126  In December 2015, PGPD Officer Jenchesky 
Santiago was convicted on first-degree assault charges stemming from an incident 
where he held a gun to a man’s head, apparently to impress his friends.127  
In addition to these allegations of unlawful use of force and cover-up, the 
PGPD in 2010 became embroiled in a wide-ranging federal investigation into 
illegal and corrupt practices within the department.  According to the Washington 
Post, “at least 46 Prince George’s officers are either suspended or assigned to 
administrative duties for misconduct or violations.  In at least 19 of those cases, 
investigators have reason to think the officers committed a crime.”128  
In late 2010, a separate federal investigation into allegations of corruption 
among Prince George’s County government officials led to the arrest of then-
Prince George’s County Executive Jack Johnson, under suspicion of bribery and 
corruption.129  The conspiracy, alleged to have started in 2003, is thought to have 
involved a “pay-for-play” scheme wherein Johnson is accused of accepting among 
other things, cash, trips, and tickets in exchange for official favors.130  In December 
2011, Johnson was sentenced to seven years in prison.131  
At least four PGPD officers were swept up in the investigation that led to 
Johnson’s arrest.  Two county officers were indicted in federal court on charges 
related to their alleged participation in an illegal cigarette and alcohol distribution 
ring, while a third was accused of dealing drugs.132  The fourth officer, a narcotics 
detective, “accused of taking guns he had seized from criminals and reselling them 
                                                                                                                            
 
126  Lynh Bui, 2 Pr. George’s Officers are Indicted on Assault Charges, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 
2014, at B6. 
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on the streets[,] was indicted . . . on 13 counts of misconduct in office and theft, 
according to law enforcement officials and online court records.”133  
In 2010, PGPD was also marred by allegations of cheating on police academy 
exams.  The cheating scandal, which implicated approximately 30 cadets and at 
least one instructor, was not only highly embarrassing for the department, but 
threatened several ongoing criminal investigations.  The County’s State’s Attorney 
Glenn Ivey admitted that his office was forced to review all cases involving the 
alleged cheaters: “We assembled a team of prosecutors in the office to start finding 
out which cases they were on and make a case by case determination whether these 
cases should stand or not.”134  An audit conducted by the State of Maryland in 
2011 determined (without examining the allegations of cheating) that the affected 
officers did not “need to be removed from the streets because there were no 
‘substantive issues’ with their training.”135 
Despite this pattern of unlawful and corrupt behavior among PGPD officers 
and a continued absence of respect for the rule of law among certain county 
officials, it is hard to draw any definitive conclusions about the effectiveness or 
long-term viability of the reform effort.  There is simply not enough known about 
the department to make a legitimate assessment of efforts to change the 
department’s approach to the use of force and external accountability.  
Further, the lack of available information on the PGPD reform effort seems to 
support the notion that the Prince George’s County government is either unwilling 
or unable to make police accountability and department transparency a priority, 
despite claims to the contrary. 136   The widespread unwillingness among 
stakeholders to speak with me (either on or off the record) about the process adds 
weight to this conclusion.  These impressions become stronger still after even the 
most cursory examination of incidents involving the County and its police 
department since 2010, the first full year after the MOA was terminated.  
Taken together, the existing quantitative and qualitative information seems to 
suggest a wide gulf between where Prince George’s County appears to be and 
where the Justice Department would have wanted them to be seven years after the 
MOA was signed. 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
133 Matt Zapotosky, Prince George’s Police Officer Indicted, WASH. POST (Oct. 27, 2010), 
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E. Los Angeles, California 
 
On July 15, 2001 the City of Los Angeles and the DOJ formalized what 
remains arguably the most comprehensive, pervasive reform instrument authorized 
under § 14141.  Like the agreements discussed above, the LAPD consent decree 
(CD) addressed a pattern or practice of excessive force and the absence of requisite 
officer accountability and inadequate oversight.137  The DOJ also sought to address 
unlawful search and arrest protocols, treatment of mentally ill suspects, and racial 
inequities in the administration of both traffic and pedestrian stops, in order to 
remedy problems with both the receipt and investigation of complaints filed 
against LAPD officers, as well as the management of confidential informants and 
department gang units.138  
The CD relied heavily on increased officer training and the institution of 
several mechanisms designed to strengthen both internal and external 
accountability.  In addition to the development of an early warning system 
designed to predict officer misconduct, the LAPD agreed to conduct regular audits 
of CD-related performance and to accept enhanced oversight from the City’s 
Inspector General and the Police Commission,139 a civilian body instituted in the 
1920s to oversee the Department.140  
Former prosecutor Michael Cherkasky served as independent monitor, 
charged with overseeing implementation.141  On July 17, 2009, Federal District 
Court Judge Gary Feess signed an order approving termination of all but a few 
provisions of the original CD.142  The consent decree was formally terminated on 
May 15, 2013.143 
Much of the response to the reform effort has been positive.  Attorney 
Merrick Bobb, who is currently the Independent Monitor of the § 14141 process in 
Seattle and longtime Los Angeles resident, saw the LAPD go from “an occupying 
                                                                                                                            
 
137 Consent Decree, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC (C.D. Cal. 
June 15, 2001), http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/final_consent_decree.pdf.  
138  Id. 
139  Id. 
140 The Function and Role of the Board of Police Commissioners, L.A. POLICE DEP’T, 
http://www.lapdonline.org/police_commission/content_basic_view/900 (last visited Sept. 4, 2016). 
141  Patrick McGreevy, N.Y. Firm Chosen to Monitor Reforms, L.A. TIMES (May 19, 2001), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2001/may/19/local/me-65453. 
142  Order Re: Transition Agreement, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC 
(C.D. Cal. July 17, 2009), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2010/12/15/US_v_LosAngeles_TA-Order_071709.pdf. 
143  Joel Rubin, Federal Judge Lifts LAPD Consent Decree, L.A. TIMES (May 16, 2013), 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/may/16/local/la-me-lapd-consent-decree-20130517; Order of 
Dismissal, United States v. City of Los Angeles, 2:00-cv-11769-GAF-RC (C.D. Cal. May 15, 2013), 
http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PN-CA-0002-0069.pdf. 
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army to being a community partner.”144   Critics of the Department also have 
recognized a change.  “I’m not particularly fond of the police,” said Clarence 
Heard, a minister in South Los Angeles, “but, to be honest with you, I think L.A. is 
much better since the feds took over the LAPD.  You know, I think they work 
harder at trying to defuse a situation as opposed to escalating a situation.”145  
According to the executive director of the ACLU of Southern California, the 
consent decree process resulted in “serious culture changes” to the Department.146   
In 2009, Harvard University published a comprehensive analysis of the 
LAPD, with a particular focus on the effects of the consent decree on officer 
morale and performance, police-community relations, and the accountability 
infrastructure inside the Department.147  After reviewing available administrative 
data, including figures on use of force, citizen complaints, and traffic and 
pedestrian stops, as well as survey and interview data gathered from citizens and 
LAPD staff, the authors conclude that the “LAPD of today is a changed 
organization.” 148   The available empirical evidence largely supports these 
observations,149 beginning with the absence of any visible increases in jurisdiction 
crime rates.  Figure 15 makes clear that pattern or practice reform in Los Angeles 
had no adverse effect on the City’s violent or property crime. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
144 Kirk Siegler, LAPD Chief Has Lessons to Share About Department’s Past ‘Ghosts,’ NPR 
(Dec. 15, 2014, 4:30 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/12/15/370952512/lapd-
chief-has-lessons-to-share-about-departments-past-ghosts. 
145 Carrie Kahn, After Riots, Scandal Sparked Reform in LAPD, NPR (Apr. 25, 2012, 5:50 
PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/04/25/151354376/after-riots-scandal-sparked-reform-in-lapd. 
146 Rubin, supra note 143. 
147 CHRISTOPHER STONE ET AL., POLICING LOS ANGELES UNDER A CONSENT DECREE: THE 
DYNAMICS OF CHANGE AT THE LAPD 1 (2009), http://www.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/Harvard-
LAPD%20Study.pdf.  
148 Id. at 68. 
149 See IAN AYRES & JONATHAN BOROWSKY, A STUDY OF RACIALLY DISPARATE OUTCOMES IN 
THE LOS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT (2008), https://www.aclusocal.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/09/11837125-LAPD-Racial-Profiling-Report-ACLU.pdf.  Their analysis of 
traffic and pedestrian stops from June 2003 to June 2004 found that “African Americans and 
Hispanics are over-stopped, over-frisked, over-searched, and over-arrested.”  Id. at i.  An analysis of 
these data published in 2006 by another team of academic researchers made similar findings, though 
presented their conclusions in starkly different language.  See ANALYSIS GROUP, PEDESTRIAN AND 
MOTOR VEHICLE POST-STOP DATA ANALYSIS REPORT (2006), 
http://assets.lapdonline.org/assets/pdf/ped_motor_veh_data_analysis_report.pdf. 
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Figure 15. Crime in Los Angeles, CA (1985–2012) 
 
 
                 Source: FBI Uniform Crime Report 
 
 
Figure 16. Use of Force by LAPD Officers (2001–2015) 
 
 
               Source: LAPD.  Note: Data on non-categorical use of force missing for 2003. 
 
Between 2001, when the CD was instituted, and 2009, when the Transition 
Agreement went into effect, the LAPD averaged just over seventy officer-involved 
shootings per year.  In the six years since, the yearly average fell to 47.8, a drop of 
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22.4 percent.  Incidence of non-categorical (non-deadly) use of force spiked in 
2004, but has remained relatively constant since, as is shown in Figure 16.  During 
the CD, LAPD officers used non-categorical force 1,894 times per year on 
average, compared to 1,759 such incidents between 2010 and 2015.  As no pre-CD 
data is available, it is impossible to know how these reform and post-reform data 
compare to pre-CD use of force levels.  But that incidence of both deadly and non-
deadly force trend down at least suggests that there has not been considerable 
backsliding in the absence of DOJ oversight.  
 
Figure 17. Use of Force-Related Civil Litigation in Los Angeles (1996–2012) 
 
 
            Source: City of Los Angeles 
 
Data on use of force-related litigation, charted in Figure 17, is consistent with 
these conclusions.  Between 1996 and 2001, when the CD was enacted, citizens 
filed an average of 240 civil suits alleging excessive force by LAPD officers.  
During that period, plaintiffs won an average of 36 percent of the time.  Between 
2002 and 2009, average annual litigation fell to 150, with plaintiff remaining flat at 
35 percent.  Between 2010, the first full year after the transition agreement was 
signed, and 2012, plaintiffs won on 27 percent of the 119 suits filed on an average 
annual basis.  
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Figure 18. Financial Awards for Use of Force-Related Civil Litigation  
in Los Angeles (1996–2012) 
 
 
         Source: City of Los Angeles 
 
That the volume of civil litigation related to officer use of force and the odds 
of a plaintiff victory each declined fairly steadily during the CD period and 
continued to decline as the Department transitioned from federal oversight is a 
solid indication that out-of-policy force events have become less common, which 
reflects positively on the reform effort.  Data on force-related payouts complicates 
the story a bit.  As is clear in Figure 18, which documents the total annual cost of 
force-related civil litigation and the average payout of each plaintiff victory 
between 1996 and 2012, the cost of police abuse is more variable than case filings.  
Though the trend lines for each variable appear to slope downward, there are 
three clear spikes: 1999/2000, 2007, and 2010.  In 2007 and 2010, these payout 
spikes occurred without significant corresponding spikes in either the volume of 
cases filed or recorded use of force events, which suggests that they can reasonably 
be attributed to a particularly severe incident or series of incidents, like the May 1, 
2007 confrontation between immigration protestors and LAPD officers in 
MacArthur Park.150  Uses of force incidents such as these are unavoidable in a city 
as large and as diverse as Los Angeles.  That two such high profile and significant 
                                                                                                                            
 
150 Maeve Reston & Joel Rubin, Los Angeles to Pay $13 Million to Settle May Day Melee 
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events occurred in a three-year period is most likely an indication of this 
inevitability, though something that should be monitored fairly closely.  
Tellingly, the CD process has been credited with minimizing the effects of 
these types of violent incidents: “Los Angeles has had its fair share of officer-
involved shootings recently, and they still generate protests.  But things haven’t 
really gotten out of hand.  Police reform groups and many LAPD officials say this 
is a testament to all the work that’s been done to repair relations with communities 
over the year.”151  
The Harvard report concludes with a note about the sustainability of the 
changes found: “It is not that policing in Los Angeles is all that it can ever be, but 
the balance of local leadership and local oversight is healthy enough to carry the 
process of continuous improvement forward” in the absence of DOJ oversight.152  
The strongest argument to be made along these lines will surely include 
discussion of the relatively strong external accountability mechanisms in Los 
Angeles.  Pre-existing institutions like the Police Commission and the City’s 
Inspector General’s Office were empowered by the consent decree and appear as 
of this writing to remain active in their oversight of the LAPD.153  Moreover, the 
city has a strong network of civil rights organizations to buttress these formal 
institutions, as well as an active local media.  One manifestation of this external 
oversight is the extent to which the Department has committed to sharing 
performance data and other information with the public.  According to a recent 
analysis of 350 police department websites, the LAPD ranked third in terms of web 
based transparency.154  
To some, including author and attorney Tom Hayden, the current regulatory 
infrastructure is insufficient: “[W]ithout the oversight of a federal judge and a 
consent decree road map, the system of police reform in Los Angeles will remain 
ad hoc, ineffective and even broken. . . . Beneath the layers of reform added to the 
department over three decades, it remains the fact that the police predominate in 
                                                                                                                            
 
151 Siegler, supra note 144; Tim Rutten, LAPD Has Made Great Strides, Thanks to Consent 
Decree, Reform Minded Chiefs, L.A. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 22, 2014, 10:56 AM), 
http://www.dailynews.com/opinion/20140822/lapd-has-made-great-strides-thanks-to-consent-decree-
reform-minded-chiefs-tim-rutten. 
152 STONE ET AL., supra note 147, at 68. 
153 See Special Investigations Reports, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL L.A. POLICE 
COMMISSION, http://www.oig.lacity.org/#!special-investigations-reports/onf50 (last visited Nov. 1, 2016). 
154 Between November 2013 and March 2014, Author reviewed the contents of 350 U.S. 
police and sheriff’s department websites in an attempt to document the extent to which local law 
enforcement agencies use the Internet to share information with the public.  Each website was scored 
on a 26-point scale, tracking the presence of data ranging from officer contact information and 
department social media presence to data on traffic stops and use of force.  The full dataset is on file 
with author.  
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policing the police.”155  This skepticism is surely a function of the Department’s 
long history of violence, racial injustice, and impunity.  The view of Earl Ofari 
Hutchinson, president of the Los Angeles Urban Policy Roundtable, is instructive:  
 
There are still some of the old troubling signs . . . . Officers that overuse 
deadly force or commit acts of misconduct must be punished.  Without it, 
it reinforces the notion that officers can administer street corner justice.  
This is the practice that got the LAPD into so much hot water in years 
past.156 
 
V. ANALYSIS 
 
A. Variations in Outcomes 
 
Organizational response to the termination of pattern or practice reform varied 
considerably between police departments in Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Washington, 
D.C., Prince George’s County, and Los Angeles.  The PBP was not able to sustain 
organizational changes made under federal oversight.  Key outcomes that remained 
flat during implementation, including use of force incidence and allegations of 
misconduct, now trend upward.  Though there is new leadership in place, the PBP 
is less than two years removed from the corruption scandal and several high profile 
force-related incidents that prompted Pittsburgh Mayor Bill Peduto to declare the 
department “on the verge of another consent decree.”157  
By contrast, the process seems to have had a sustained, positive effect in both 
Cincinnati and Washington, D.C.  Numbers of post-reform citizen complaints 
against CPD officers continue to decline, as does use of force incidence, and the 
number of injuries sustained by CPD officers.  Such progress has contributed to 
strengthening the relationship between the Department and minority community 
members158 and a sterling national reputation.159  In Washington, D.C., declines in 
                                                                                                                            
 
155 Tom Hayden, Has Bratton’s LAPD Really Reformed?, NATION (July 20, 2009),  
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both deadly force incidence and force-based civil litigation suggest that the consent 
decree brought with it significant improvements in department use of force policy, 
training, and oversight.  Inconsistencies in citizen complaint volume complicate 
the picture somewhat, as does the startling number of officers that have faced 
criminal charges in the post-reform years, though on balance the department 
appears to have made and sustained considerable progress.  Similar positive trends 
are evident in Los Angeles, though there has been less time to evaluate post-reform 
progress there.  
Objective evaluation of Prince George’s County is rather difficult, given the 
limited amount of data made available.  But it seems apparent that the department 
continues to struggle with officer misconduct and has quite a ways to go to reach 
the kind of accountability infrastructure developed in other jurisdictions.  
Even in light of certain methodological limitations, these findings highlight 
the challenge jurisdictions face in working to institutionalize pattern or practice 
reform.  They also demonstrate how little we actually know about the effectiveness 
and sustainability of pattern or practice reform.  
 
B. The Need for More Consistent Data 
 
Owing largely to the absence of consistent outcome data and a lack of 
cooperation among potential subject jurisdictions, it is rather difficult to generalize 
beyond the included cities.  Further, without the data needed to properly establish 
benchmarks, formal consideration of causal hypotheses was all but impossible.  In 
the absence of a deeper quantitative analysis, there remains the possibility that 
some of the trends discussed occurred as a result of factors other than reform 
implementation or termination.  
The need to evaluate the effectiveness and long-term sustainability of these 
initiatives is clear, yet we lack the basic data needed to do so.  This need not be the 
case.  In some jurisdictions, including Los Angeles, the DOJ has insisted on the 
capture and publication of relevant outcome measures. 160   Mandating the 
dissemination of use of force statistics, officer disciplinary decisions, and civil 
litigation results would be a solid step toward facilitating evaluation of future 
settlement agreements, as would requiring independent monitors to set and report 
on outcome-related goals, rather than continuing to perform what amounts to an 
exclusively process-driven assessment.  
 
C. The Need for More Thorough, Nuanced Analysis 
 
The field would also benefit from future research that moves beyond the use 
of outcome data to evaluate sustainability, beginning with an assessment of officer 
                                                                                                                            
(Aug. 29, 2014, 11:52 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/michael-brown-shooting/blueprint-
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attitudes and organizational culture more broadly.  In addition to contributing to 
more thorough descriptive knowledge, examining the relationship between 
outcomes, officer behavior, and department culture, would help to broaden 
understanding of those factors that explain institutionalization success and failure.  
To what extent do these elements show a consistent picture of agency efforts to 
pursue and institutionalize reform?  Can a department achieve and sustain 
desirable levels of key outcomes, for example, in spite of a culture that may not 
reflect core reform values?  
A closer look at the inner-workings of affected departments would allow for a 
much more nuanced assessment of change.  By necessity, the current research 
framed pattern or practice reform as a monolithic initiative, rather than as a series 
of individual components.  In fact, development and implementation of each 
component, from new policies and training to community outreach efforts, are 
unique, distinguishable efforts, each worthy of a separate evaluation.  As it stands 
today, it is all but impossible to tease out the value of specific components, either 
in terms of their effectiveness or sustainability.  Does a department’s use of an 
early intervention system actually lead to fewer incidents of misconduct and lower 
civil litigation costs?  To what extent does the system’s effectiveness change over 
time?  Is there an interaction between system usage and officer training, in terms of 
both short- and long-term outcomes?  Answers to these and other similar questions 
would improve the efficiency of future settlement agreements and aid departments 
in institutionalizing change.  
Finally, future research should continue to monitor these and other pattern or 
practice jurisdictions, paying particular attention to identifying those factors that 
distinguish reforms that endure from those that erode.  Explaining the success in 
Cincinnati would be a useful point of departure.  To what extent did support for 
reform among city leaders and community residents contribute to the durability of 
that Department’s turn-around?  The strength of officer accountability 
mechanisms, both internal to the CPD and in agencies like the Citizen Complaint 
Authority?  Strategic efforts to coopt potentially hostile groups like the officers’ 
union?  Was support from middle management as critical in Cincinnati as it was to 
sustaining problem-oriented policing strategies in Charlotte, North Carolina?161  
Perhaps sustainability is a function of robust efforts to educate officers to “nature, 
goals, and benefits” of such reforms, as some contend.162  
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The best evidence on the DOJ’s pattern or practice initiative suggests that 
after implementing mandated reforms, affected departments will likely possess a 
stronger, more capable accountability infrastructure, more robust training, and a set 
of policies that reflect national best practices.163  These changes occur as a result of 
the agreements’ substantive requirements and the close, external oversight that 
tends to accompany their implementation.  
But as the current research shows, the reform process is more complex than 
the pursuit of substantial compliance with settlement terms.  The resultant 
organizational changes are not self-sustaining; implementation does not in and of 
itself guarantee meaningful, institutionalized change.  In fact, the assumption that it 
does may undermine efforts to promote lasting reform.  The typical settlement 
agreement binds affected departments to a five-year period of federal oversight.  
Upon a declaration of substantial compliance, which usually occurs on or around 
the end of the contractual term, the DOJ announces that department has been 
reformed, promptly terminates the agreement, and moves on to other initiatives.164  
This abrupt stoppage signals to the department that sufficient change has been 
made and that no further attention to the reform is necessary.  Given how tenuous 
these reforms appear to be and how unpopular they remain among the rank-and-
file, the goals of the initiative would likely be better served by ongoing external 
oversight of the affected department.  Periodic external check-ups designed to 
promote independent post-termination oversight, whether conducted by DOJ 
attorneys or a public agency similar to the one created by the State of New 
Jersey,165 would be a worthwhile investment.  
The absence of sufficient monitoring and oversight can be tragic.  The City of 
Cleveland knows this well.  In August 2000, the DOJ opened a pattern or practice 
investigation into claims of excessive force by Cleveland Division of Police (CDP) 
officers.166  
In July 2002, the year Tamir Rice was born and twelve years before his fatal 
encounter with the Cleveland Police Department, DOJ attorneys recommended that 
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the CDP “clarify its use of deadly force policy,”167 while raising questions about 
“the competency, thoroughness, and impartiality of [CDP] use of force 
investigations” 168 —nearly identical to language drawn from the Investigative 
Findings Letter sent to Cleveland Mayor Frank Jackson in December 2014.169  
Though the case of police reform in Cleveland is certainly unique, the 
overarching point remains: organizational change is a long and fragile process.  
Effectiveness is not guaranteed and early gains do not necessarily equate to 
institutionalized change.  This lesson is a critical one, for DOJ staff and 
stakeholders in jurisdictions currently under federal oversight, for police leaders 
and other public actors contemplating reform, and for policing scholars and other 
students of the administrative process.  The sooner it takes hold, the more likely it 
is that changes brought about through the pattern or practice initiative will not 
suffer the fate of other recent reform efforts. 
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